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How the public translates economic information into opinions about their 
leaders is a fundamental question at the intersection of political economy and 
mass politics. A prominent study by MacKuen, Erikson, and Stimson (1992) 
found evidence in support of a rational-expectations model of economic 
voting, whereby the public judges the president not on how past economic 
performance has affected them personally (like a “peasant”) but rather 
according to full information about national economic forecasts and/or the 
implications of current policies for future performance (like a “banker”). We 
test how well this model travels to Uruguay using an original monthly time 
series on presidential approval, objective indicators of economic conditions, 
and consumer confidence levels. Results reject both the “peasant” and the 
“banker” logic and, instead, suggest Uruguayans translate information about 
the economy into personal economic prospections and judge the president 
accordingly. Since this process borrows the personal/egotropic element of the 
“peasant” logic and the prospective element of the “banker” logic, blending 
these caricatures we conclude the political economy of presidential approval 
in Uruguay resembles that of a “piggybanker.”
Keywords: economic vote, presidential approval, Uruguay, egotropic and socio 
tropic perceptions, prospective and retrospective economic perceptions. 
¿campesinos, banqUeros o ahorristas? la 
economía y la aprobación presidencial en UrUgUay
La forma en que la opinión pública traduce la información económica en 
opiniones sobre sus líderes es un tema fundamental en la relación entre 
economía política y la política de masas. El famoso estudio de MacKuen, Erikson 
y Stimson (1992) demostró que existe un modelo de voto económico basado 
en expectativas racionales, donde el público no juzga al presidente a partir de la 
forma en que el desempeño económico del pasado los ha afectado personalmente 
(como “campesinos”), sino a partir de como el estado de la economía nacional, 
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y/o de la implementación de ciertas políticas, puede afectar el desempeño de 
la economía en futuro (como “banqueros”). Aquí usando una serie mensual 
de datos sobre aprobación presidencial, indicadores objetivos de condiciones 
económicas y niveles de confianza de los consumidores, testeamos qué tan bien 
aplica este modelo para el caso de Uruguay. Los resultados permiten rechazar 
tanto la lógica del “campesino” como la lógica del “banquero” y, en cambio, 
sugieren que los uruguayos juzgan al Presidente a partir de la información sobre 
la economía a partir de evaluaciones prospectivas sobre su economía personal. 
Dado que el proceso toma los elementos personales o egotrópicos de la lógica 
del “campesino” y los elementos prospectivos de la lógica del “banquero”, 
mezclamos estas caricaturas para concluir que la economía política de la 
aprobación presidencial en Uruguay se asemeja a la de un “ahorrista”.
Palabras claves: Voto económico, aprobación presidencial, Uruguay, 
percepciones egotrópicas y sociotrópicas, percepciones económicas prospectivas 
y retrospectivas.
Introduction
Political economists study how the economy affects politics and how politics affects 
the economy. At the level of mass politics, the first question boils down to if and how 
the polity’s experience with the economy becomes manifest in politics. In a seminal 
article MacKuen, Erickson, and Stimson (1992:597) juxtaposed the following two 
explanations:
Consider two caricatures: peasant and banker. The peasant judges the 
government by present personal experience. He or she eschews abstraction 
and, instead, relies on what may be seen and felt directly, on direct personal 
experience. The future is imagination, the present is reality. Turning to politics, 
the question is simply put: ‘What have you done for me lately?’ The banker, 
in contrast, is indifferent about the past except as it portends the future. The 
banker judges the government by its ability to shepherd the future. Ignoring 
current conditions, the banker attends to matters of systemic consequence 
that indicate the government’s wisdom, rather than its appetite. The banker 
asks, ‘What are your prospects?’ Clearly, these are matters of degree, rather 
than absolutes. No individual – and certainly no society – will act purely as 
peasant or as banker. It is our intent to evaluate the extent to which the U.S. 
political economy reflects the intelligence of a peasant or banker.
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Compared to myopic peasants, more sophisticated bankers are theorized to behave 
in line with assumptions of rational-expectations models of economic behavior. 
That is, to form economic perceptions based on the future implications of current 
economic policy and/or information gleaned from economic forecasts. Therefore 
bankers ought to deeply discount current economic conditions since, with the 
exception of unforeseeable shocks, they were presumably already factored into their 
economic perceptions. 
This model contrasts with others that assume the public extrapolates information 
about past economic performance into the future (e.g. Fiorina, 1981, Alt and Chrystal, 
1983). In the parlance of the ongoing theoretical debate in political science, peasants 
engage in retrospective, i.e. looking backward from the present, egotropic (or “pocketbook”) 
economic voting, which encompasses incumbent vote choice and approval. Bankers’ 
economic voting is instead prospective, i.e. looking forward from the present, and 
sociotropic i.e. responding to national rather than personal economic conditions. 
As compelling as this model of mass politics may be, we do not know whether it 
holds beyond the United States. Might publics in the developing world operate under 
a distinct political-economic logic? We probe this question with data from Uruguay 
from 2007 to 2013, a period that spans much of the first presidencies of left-leaning 
socio-democratic Frente Amplio, Tabaré Vázquez (March 2005 to April 2010) and José 
Mujica (March 2010 to April 2015). Rather than peasant or bankers, the empirical 
portrait of the Uruguayan electorate is one of “piggybankers”: presidential approval 
is largely a function of personal prospections, i.e. egotropic-prospective economic 
perceptions. Though our results partially confirm those of previous case studies of 
economic voting in Uruguay (Luna, 2002), they challenge the conclusions of both 
the original “Peasants or Bankers” study and much of the received wisdom from the 
literature on economic voting in Latin America and Western Europe.
1. Case Selection
At the outset, let us acknowledge that MacKuen, Erikson, and Stimson’s (1992) 
“Peasants or Bankers” article is a case study. Case studies can generate testable 
hypotheses but testing theories is not their strong suit (Gerring, 2004). To our 
knowledge, the rational-expectations model of presidential approval has not been 
tested beyond the United States. Although some of the assumptions of rational 
expectations thesis have been partially integrated into comparative studies of 
economic voting (e.g., Duch and Stevenson, 2008), elevating it to the level of a 
“theory” would require a great deal more systematic evidence. 
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Perhaps the most obvious reason why this model has received scant attention by 
comparativists is the lack of comparable data. The data demands include not only 
presidential approval, which is difficult but fairly common to find for developing 
countries, but also disaggregated measures of consumer confidence and reliable 
national sources for economic indicators such as inflation and unemployment, 
which are comparatively more difficult to find for long periods. Moreover, we 
prefer monthly time series in order to track these dynamics with the most fine-
grained instruments available. Not surprisingly, then, the quality and availability of 
data on the variables most central to the rational-expectations model help drive our 
case selection. On these scores Uruguay fits the bill as well as any other country 
in Latin America. Nevertheless, some of the data necessary for a complete test of 
each aspect of MacKuen, Erikson, and Stimson’s (1992) analyses are lacking for the 
Uruguayan case. We proceed with caution with this limitation in mind and draw 
our conclusions accordingly. 
By any measure, Uruguay is one of most socially and economically developed and 
best governed democracies in Latin America (cf. Mainwaring and Scully, 2008). 
Indeed, we might conclude that Uruguay is comprised of even fewer “peasants” than 
the United States. According to the World Bank’s World Development Indicators 
(WDI), a far greater proportion of the population is rural in the United States 
(19%) than in Uruguay (5%). Using national poverty lines, which are admittedly 
imperfectly comparable, only 3% of Uruguay’s rural population is poor whereas the 
U.S. Census Bureau estimates 16.1% of rural Americans lived below the national 
poverty line in 2013 (DeNavas-Walt and Proctor, 2014). Of course these numbers 
probably mask, in global terms, a more substantial rural peasantry in Uruguay. In any 
event, urban poverty rates in Uruguay have fallen from 18.7% in 2010 to 12% in 
2013, just below that of the United States (14.5%) in 2013. Given these comparisons, 
it may not be far-fetched to expect that Uruguayan electorate to evaluate its leaders 
in much the same way as the American electorate. 
Even if Uruguay does not necessarily have more “peasants” than the United States, 
it could well have fewer “bankers.” WDI data from 2010 show that the percentage of 
firms that uses banks to finance investment in Uruguay (13.7%) is among the lowest 
in Latin America. By comparison, the numbers are 21.1% in Nicaragua, 26.6% in 
Guatemala, 27.8% in Bolivia, 30.1% in Paraguay, in El Salvador the rate is 31.8%, in 
Colombia 35%, in Chile 44.8%, in Peru 45.9%. In this respect, Uruguay is closest to 
countries like Honduras, Mexico, and Ecuador, which register 16-17%. To the extent 
that this taps the prevalence of a “banker” mentality these figures could be telling.
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Personal finances may be less tied to market forces in Uruguay thanks to its relatively 
strong welfare state (see discussion in Pribble, 2013).1 Yet the United States’ 2013 
gross national income per capita ($53,750, measured in current international dollars 
and weighted for purchasing power parity) outstrips Uruguay’s ($18,940) by nearly 
a factor of three. Thus Uruguay may resemble the “banker” model of presidential 
approval much less than the United States does. 
Viewed in light of recent research on economic voting in Latin America, our 
expectations for the Uruguayan case do not get much clearer. Singer and Carlin 
(2013) find retrospective-sociotropic voting is the most prevalent form of economic 
voting as it is in a great deal of other comparative politics research (for reviews see 
Duch, 2007 and Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2000, 2013). Egotropic concerns – one 
of two hallmarks of the “peasant” logic – appear to dominate sociotropic concerns 
only in Latin America’s poorest countries (which excludes Uruguay), and prospective 
perceptions – a key aspect of the “bankers” logic – only matter until the president has 
had time to establish an economic track record. Luna’s (2002) study of Uruguay finds 
support for egotropic and sociotropic forms of economic voting but its measures do 
not incorporate a temporal dimension and, thus, cannot speak directly to the debate 
of the precise nature of economic voting there. In sum, what evidence we have about 
economic voting in Latin America is inconsistent with the rational-expectations 
model, and the extant evidence from Uruguay does not help us rule out any model. 
Before going further, we would like to reiterate that our case study cannot make 
or break the rational-expectations model of economic voting. Rather, it can probe 
the scope conditions under which it holds—namely, a stable, prosperous democracy 
in Latin America. Whether the Uruguayan public links economic information to 
political evaluations like “peasants” or “bankers” or according to a different logic 
entirely, our analysis will shed new light on the venerable question concerning how 
the economy influences the formation of public approval of the president.
2. Data and Measurement
This test of the “Peasants or Bankers” thesis requires time-serial measures of 
presidential approval, subjective economic perceptions, and objective economic 
conditions. Given the richness of the data, our analyses employ monthly time series 
for each. Here we discuss these measures in turn.
1 Using 2011 WDI data, the most recent estimates, Uruguay spent a greater percentage of its total 
expenditures on education (14.9%) than the United States (13%). In 2013, Uruguay spent 70.2% of 
total government expenditures went to health compared to 47.1% in the United States.
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2.1 Presidential Approval
Compared to many Latin American democracies, Uruguay has a long tradition 
of tracking presidential approval. Nonetheless, differences in question wording 
and response sets across pollsters, the length and temporality of any given survey 
house’s series, missing data, and changing sample frames frustrate straightforward 
measurement of presidential approval over long periods. Moreover, the choice of 
series among the available options is essentially arbitrary without some consensus 
on the proper way to measure presidential approval. To resolve these issues, we 
combine all publically available approval series for Uruguay from 1985 to 2013 into 
a single “smoothed” monthly time series of presidential approval. 
Our approach relies on a measurement model derived from Stimson’s (1991) dyad-
ratios algorithm. This fairly common strategy in macro-opinion studies of the U.S. 
(e.g. Erickson, MacKuen and Stimson 2002, Enns and Kellstedt 2008) has been 
increasingly used in comparative approval research (Carlin, Hartlyn and Martínez-
Gallardo, 2012) including in Latin America (Carlin, Love and Martínez-Gallardo, 
2015a, 2015b).2 The model assumes that to the extent a given data time series is a 
valid indicator of presidential approval, the ratio of any two values within the series 
is a relative indicator of presidential approval. The algorithm uses all such dyadic 
ratios within a given series to estimate presidential approval values at regular (here, 
monthly) time intervals. 
To combine N time series – presumably tapping presidential approval – each raw 
data series undergoes this transformation, resulting in N dyads-ratio series. If these 
N dyads-ratio series are indeed relative indicators of presidential approval, they 
should co-vary where they have temporal overlap. To test whether this is true, the 
algorithm examines the common variance in N dyads-ratio series to see if they do, 
in fact, tap a single latent construct (presidential approval). From this covariance, 
validity estimates are computed for each of the N series, and these are used along 
with weights for sample size to estimate the best single underlying series of latent 
approval. Exponential smoothing on the resulting series removes random fluctuation 
due to sampling error and thus sharpens the estimates. 
Using this approach we construct an original dataset of executive approval for 
Uruguay from 1986-2013. It employs input from 8 unique data series gauging 
presidential “approval” (aprobar/desaprobar), “favorability” (favorable/desfavorable), and 
2 Data series for these studies and the present one are publically available as part of the Executive 
Approval Project (www.executiveapproval.org).
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“ratings” (e.g. muy bien, bien, regular, mal, muy mal) of the president’s “management” 
(gestión), “performance” (desempeño), and “image” (imagen). We follow Erikson, 
MacKuen, and Stimson (2002) and calculate approval as follows: % approval/(% 
approval + % disapproval). This is advisable because response choices vary from 4 
and 5 point scales to trichotomies that include a neutral category to dichotomous 
measures, and because some respondents say they do not know or fail to answer. 
The exigency of finding both approval and disapproval series limits our sample 
somewhat. Nonetheless, we collected and used a total of 379 survey marginals 
broken down by firm, series, and cases as follows: Equipos MORI (urban 1986-
2011, 119 cases; national 1990-2012, 138 cases), Factum (1997-2013, 45 cases), Cifra 
Raga & Asociados (performance 1999-2013, 12 cases; sympathy 2000-2013, 5 cases), 
Interconsult (2000-2012, 47 cases), AmericasBarometer (2007-2012, 4 cases), and 
Grupo Radar (2005-2006, 3 cases). These series range from monthly to quarterly, 
to annually, to biannually. From this series, we only employ the segments for which 
we have corresponding data for consumer confidence (July 2007-August 2013). On 
average, each month draws from 1.13 data points.
Two pieces of evidence suggest our approach was successful. First, a single dimension 
– which we assume captures presidential approval – accounts for 94.2% of the 
variance in the series (Eigen estimate 1.09 of a possible 1.15). Second, most of the 
input series load above 0.90 on the latent factor,3 a far more stringent level than 
even the most conservative criterion for confirmatory factor analysis. This suggests 
that, despite distinct question wordings, response sets, sample, and temporality, each 
of the series taps the same underlying construct. Thus we feel confident in the 
validity of our monthly measure of presidential approval in Uruguay. 
2.2 Subjective Economic Perceptions 
Measures of subjective economic perceptions come from a joint venture by the 
Department of Economics at the Universidad Católica de Uruguay and Equipos 
Consultores Asociados known as the Programa de Opinión Pública y Confianza 
Económica (POPCE). This team measures roughly 400 cases sampled from urban 
centers of at least 10,000 inhabitants throughout Uruguay and constructs an overall 
Index of Consumer Confidence (ICC) that ranges 0-100 (sampling error ± 4.8, 95% 
3 Presented in order, the loadings on the first dimensions are: Grupo Radar (0.988), Equipos MORI 
(urban 0.987, national 0.987), Factum (1997-2013), Cifra Raga & Asociados (sympathy 0.983, 
performance 0.964), Interconsult (0.957), and AmericasBarometer (0.711). 
80 Política / Revista de Ciencia Política
Peasants,Bankers, or Piggybankers?
confidence interval) using the simple averages of the six questions below.4 We have 
added the labels (in CAPS) by which we will refer to these variables in our analyses.
1. SHORT-RUN NATIONAL PROSPECTIONS. How do you think the 
country’s economic situation will be within one year? Better, the same, or 
worse than it is currently?
2. LONG-RUN NATIONAL PROSPECTIONS. How do you think the 
country’s economic situation will be within three years? Better, the same, or 
worse than it is currently? 
3. PERSONAL RETROSPECTIONS. How is your personal economic situation 
in relation to one year ago? Would you say it has improved, has stayed the same, 
or worsened?
4. PERSONAL PROSPECTIONS. What do you think will happen to your 
personal economic situation within one year? Do you think it will improve, 
stay the same, or worsen?
5. CURRENT BUYING CONDITIONS HOUSEHOLD DURABLES. Do 
you think it is a good time to make purchases such as, for example, home 
appliances?
6. CURRENT BUYING CONDITIONS AUTOS/HOUSES. Do you think 
it is a good time to make more important purchases such as automobiles or to 
move houses?
In this study, we will employ the ICC as well as these six constituent parts. When we 
use the ICC, our measure combines data points reported on both the POPCE and 
Equipos websites using the dyad-ratios algorithm discussed above. The two form a 
highly reliable smoothed series for which a single dimension taps roughly 97% of 
the variation.
Note that this index lacks a retrospective measure of national economic conditions, 
or what Kinder and Kiewiet (1979, 1981) dubbed nationally-oriented perceptions 
“sociotropic” and what Mackuen, Erikson, and Stimson (1992) refer to as “business” 
conditions. While this does not preclude a test of the peasants-bankers thesis per 
se, it means we can only adjudicate between three of the four prevailing models 
4 Interested readers should consult Vázquez, García and Rocha (2010) for an extended discussion 
about the index’s construction and validation.
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of economic voting in Uruguay. Given the robustness of sociotropic-retrospective 
economic voting in comparative research this is unfortunate.
Figure 1 
Inflation, Unemployment, Index of Consumer Confidence, and Presidential 
Approval, Uruguay July 2007- August 2013
2.3 Objective Economic Conditions
The three objective measures of national economic conditions we use in this 
investigation are unemployment, inflation, and average household incomes. All 
three monthly series come from the Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas and were 
accessed in April 2014. Inflation is measured with a consumer price index (based 
on December 2010 = 100). Average income levels are measured for households 
with rental value and include aguinaldos. This series is logged (base 10) to make 
regression coefficients more interpretable. Rather than differencing or lagging any 
of these variables, as MacKuen, Erikson, and Stimson (1992) do without much 
justification, we rely chiefly on these variables’ levels. However, we note that our 
main inferences do not hinge on how whether these variables are treated as levels, 
lagged, or differenced.
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Figure 1 overlays these series onto the same graph with a shared y-axis that should 
be interpreted according to the variable under scrutiny. Recall that inflation reflect 
an indexed value of consumer prices (IPC), unemployment is a simple percentage, 
consumer confidence (ICC) runs 0-100, and presidential approval is calculated 
as the percentage of approval over the sum of the percentages of approval and 
disapproval. Consumer prices rise fairly steadily over this period, unemployment is 
almost static, and the ICC is variable but not terribly volatile. These starkly different 
dynamics are important to consider as we regress presidential approval on these 
three measures of the economy.
3. Modeling Presidential Approval
The analysis below, in both the questions it explores and the methods it employs, 
tracks as closely as possible with MacKuen, Erickson, and Stimson’s (1992) analysis 
given the data at hand. Unfortunately this means that we will leave some interesting 
questions about the Uruguayan case unanswered and alternative modeling approaches 
ignored. We are cognizant of this tradeoff and have decided in favor of creating a 
comparable case study rather than breaking new theoretical, methodological, or 
case-specific ground. 
Therefore, following MacKuen, Erickson, and Stimson’s lead, we model our monthly 
time series of Presidential Approval as a function of lagged Approval (at month t – 1) 
plus current values of our economic variables of interest. Using this distributed lag 
model, and the Kyock transformation it specifies, we need only to include current 
values of the independent variables since the lagged values of the dependent variable 
capture the effects of our lagged independent variables. Coefficients will, in turn, 
indicate the effects of current (time t) values of the economic variables on current 
(time t) values of Approval while controlling for lagged (time t – 1) Approval.5 Our 
models control for a six-month honeymoon at the outset of President José Mujica’s 
first term to guard against spuriousnessness that could be introduced by the most 
obvious unit effect in our data. As a final precaution, we employ robust standard errors 
given the small sample size; results change little if we cluster the standard errors on 
presidency.
5 Although the effects of the economic variables may not be fully felt until future periods, like 
MacKuen, Erickson, and Stimson we restrict ourselves to discussing current effects.
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4. The Economy, Consumer Confidence and Presidential 
Approval in Uruguay, 2007-2013
Before moving to a test of the rational-expectations thesis itself, an initial test is 
whether the conventional wisdom that presidential approval reflects macroeconomic 
conditions holds in Uruguay. Results reported in column 1 are somewhat mixed. 
Inflation is correctly signed and estimated precisely but unemployment neither 
approaches statistical significance nor returns the expected sign. Yet a Bloc F-test 
suggests the two variables are jointly significant (F (2, 47) = 5.25, p = 0.009). 
Mujica’s Honeymoon coefficient is positive, as expected, but falls just beyond the 
range of acceptable confidence (p = 0.107). 
Results in column 2 reveal what happens to the effects of the objective economic 
indicators in the presence of a subjective economic indicator—the index of consumer 
confidence (ICC). The answer is: not much. Inflation retains its negative effects and 
unemployment its null effects. We observe the expected positive influence of the 
ICC on approval Mujica’s. 
Table 1 
Economic Conditions, Consumer Confidence, and Presidential Approval 
(1) (2)
Approval
t−1
0.78***
(0.10)
0.71***
(0.12)
Inflation
t
-0.21**
(0.11)
-0.23**
(0.11)
Unemployment
t
0.02
(1.00)
0.25
(0.95)
Honeymoon 3.59
(2.18)
3.75*
(2.20)
ICC
t
0.22*
(0.12)
Constant 37.89
(22.60)
30.29
(20.98)
Observations 52 52
R2 0.88 0.88
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Honeymoon is now statistically significant if fairly small in comparison to other 
presidents (cf. Carlin, Hartlyn and Martínez-Gallardo 2012). 
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We wish to point out that the evidence in these first two models breaks with 
what MacKuen, Erickson, and Stimson (1992) theorized and observed in two ways. 
First of all, unemployment appears unrelated to presidential approval. And although 
this null finding is at odds with much work on popularity functions in advanced 
industrial democracies it is not uncommon in work on new democracies, especially 
in Latin America (for reviews see Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier, 2008: 2013). For 
the Uruguayan case, the finding runs counter to Luna’s (2002) short-term (1996-
1999) analysis of presidential approval but aligns with his longer-run results (1985-
2000). Yet strong effects of inflation and null effects of unemployment during this 
period in Uruguay squarely contradict Singer’s (2009) argument that the defeat 
of hyperinflation in Latin America has lowered inflation’s salience in the public’s 
consciousness when they evaluate presidents. 
Second, contrary to what the original “Peasants or Bankers” analysis would 
predict, the introduction of the ICC does not “wipe out” the effects of inflation 
on presidential approval. Indeed, after MacKuen, Erikson, and Stimson observed 
this in their own data from the United States, they concluded succinctly: “Clearly, 
the economy affects approval by affecting perceptions of the economy, which are 
captured by the Index [of Consumer Sentiment]” (199: 602). Thus, the translation of 
information about the economy into executive evaluations appears at least different 
and perhaps more nuanced in Uruguay. 
Rather than being deterred by this lack of fit between theory and evidence in Uruguay, 
we take it as an opportunity to probe the theoretical mechanisms more deeply. After all, 
the present analysis is a case study that seeks to test the scope conditions of a hypothesis 
derived from another case. Taken together, the results of both studies should help refine 
our understanding about the political economy of presidential approval. 
To put the process by which economic information is transmitted into presidential 
approval in Uruguay under the microscope, we break down the ICC into its 
constituent elements and analyze each separately. Results are reported in Table 2. 
Column 1 shows that personal retrospections about the economy – how the public 
views their personal economic situation today compared to one year ago – is a 
reliable predictor of presidential approval. But far from being “wiped out,” inflation 
retains its significant negative effects. In theoretical terms, then, we still do not know 
the subjective mechanisms by which objective inflationary conditions are funneled 
into presidential approval in Uruguay in this period.
When we inspect public expectations about their personal economic fate in one 
year’s time – personal prospections – we find an even stronger, if slightly less robust, 
effect on approval (see column 2). Contrary to personal retrospections, however, 
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personal prospections do “wipe out” inflation’s predictive power on presidential 
approval. Stated in theoretical terms, the Uruguayan public reliably extrapolates 
information about present levels of inflation into their assessments of their future 
personal economic well-being and strongly links them to evaluations of the sitting 
president. In a model reported in appendix Table A1, we show that this inference 
holds even when controlling for household income levels. 
As the rest of the results in Table 2 show, personal prospections are the only 
subjective economic perceptions Uruguayans use to channel information about 
inflation into presidential approval. Short-run (one year out) and long-run (three 
years out) national economic prospections neither predict approval nor swamp the 
effects of inflation on approval. The same is true for public assessments of current 
buying conditions for durables such as household durables or autos/houses. 
If the ICC had a national retrospections component, we could test the robustness 
of personal prospections in the face of national retrospections and add our voices 
to the broader debate on the nature of economic voting. Unfortunately it does 
not. Nevertheless, we can still speak to the question propelling this study: does 
the Uruguayan public dole out presidential approval like a “peasant,” grounding 
it chiefly in personal retrospections, or a “banker,” basing it on forecasts about 
the national economy? Our preliminary assessment is that neither logic fits the 
evidence. Rather, Uruguayans appear to behave like “piggybankers.” We do not, of 
course, mean this in any pejorative sense but as a way to split the difference between 
the peasants-bankers dichotomy MacKuen, Erikson and Stimson (1992) pose in 
their theoretically informed caricatures. According to our analysis, the Uruguayan 
public uses economic forecasts and/or the future implications of current policies to 
inform their assessments of personal economic prospects and evaluate the president 
accordingly. 
To probe this inference more deeply, we follow MacKuen, Erikson, and Stimson 
(1992, 602-603) and “race” the components of the ICC against each other to 
identify which most reliably drives presidential approval. Our models here specify 
lagged Approval and Honeymoon, excluding objective measures of the economy. 
Table 3 displays the results.
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Table 2 
Economic Conditions, Elements of the Index of Consumer Confidence (ICC), 
and Presidential Approval 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Approval
t−1
0.72***
(0.10)
0.67***
(0.11)
0.78***
(0.10)
0.76***
(0.10)
0.77***
(0.13)
0.77***
(0.11)
Inflation
t
-0.21*
(0.11)
-0.05
(0.18)
-0.21**
(0.10)
-0.22**
(0.10)
-0.22*
(0.13)
-0.22*
(0.12)
Unemployment
t
0.20
(1.00)
0.26
(1.05)
0.05
(1.00)
-0.38
(0.99)
0.09
(0.84)
0.09
(0.93)
Honeymoon 5.62***
(1.57)
1.98
(2.34)
3.55
(2.27)
3.77
(2.28)
3.64
(2.24)
3.65
(2.21)
Personal Retrospections
t 0.35**
(0.14)
Personal Prospections
t 0.44*
(0.26)
Short-Run  
National Prospections
t
0.03
(0.16)
Long-Run  
National Prospections
t
0.10
(0.06)
Current Buying Conditions 
Household Durables
t
0.02
(0.08)
Current Buying Conditions 
Autos/Houses
t
0.02
(0.06)
Constant 18.11
(26.17)
-0.85
(39.32)
35.84
(22.13)
36.28
(22.79)
38.11
(23.40)
38.32
(23.32)
Observations 52 52 52 52 52 52
R2 0.89 0.89 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.88
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Initial models of personal retrospections (column 1) again reveal some support 
for the “peasants” hypothesis: the better Uruguayans rate their personal economic 
situation today compared to a year ago, the better they rate their president. Columns 
2 and 3, in turn, allow us to discard the notion that Uruguayans act like “bankers” 
concerned primarily with national business prospects. Contrary to what MacKuen, 
Erickson and Stimson (1992) show for the United States, individual retrospections 
significantly affect presidential approval in Uruguay despite the presence of one-
year or three-year national economic prospections. 
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Table 3 
Presidential Approval by Components of Consumer Confidence 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Approval
t−1
0.88***
(0.07)
0.88***
(0.07)
0.85***
(0.07)
0.68***
(0.11)
0.68***
(0.11)
0.68***
(0.11)
0.68***
(0.11)
0.68***
(0.11)
Honeymoon
3.49**
(1.73)
3.48*
(1.78)
3.59**
(1.70)
2.04
(1.78)
1.56
(1.50)
1.56
(1.51)
2.04
(1.77)
2.24
(1.80)
Personal  
Retrospections
t
0.31*
(0.17)
0.31*
(0.17)
0.34**
(0.15)
0.08
(0.16)
0.08
(0.16)
0.12
(0.15)
Short-Run  
National  
Prospections
t
0.04
(0.19)
-0.00
(0.18)
0.00
(0.18)
Long-Run  
National  
Prospections
t
0.13
(0.08)
0.08
(0.07)
Personal  
Prospections
t
0.47***
(0.18)
0.51***
(0.16)
0.51***
(0.16)
0.47**
(0.18)
0.43**
(0.17)
Constant
-12.18
(10.19)
-14.20
(10.79)
-19.73*
(10.82)
-13.26
(8.83)
-9.87*
(5.58)
-9.79
(8.46)
-13.26
(9.81)
-17.53*
(10.29)
Observations 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52
R2 0.87 0.87 0.88 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Yet again, what “wipes out” the effects of personal retrospections are personal 
prospections. As column 4 indicates, when it comes to judging the incumbent, 
individuals’ beliefs about how their personal economic situation is likely to fair in 
the coming year dominates the effects of their perceptions of how things have gone 
for them over the past year. Effects of personal prospections on presidential approval 
are strongest when modeled alone (column 5) but can withstand the inclusion of 
various combinations of short- and long-run national prospections and personal 
retrospections (columns 5-8). Results change marginally if ICC components 
tapping buying conditions are modeled as well (available upon request).
Here again, we lament the absence of national retrospections, chiefly because 
they preclude a more complete test of “the quality of intelligence that governs 
the translation of economic experience into politics” (MacKuen, Erickson and 
Stimson 1992: 597). But given the strength of the “ego-tropic”/personal economic 
perceptions – both retrospective and prospective – in these models, and the overall 
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weakness of “socio-tropic”/national economic prospections alone (Table 2) and in 
the presence of “ego-tropic”/personal prospections (Table 3), it seems reasonable 
to conclude that personal prospections are the main link between the subjective 
economy and presidential approval in Uruguay during the period under study. 
5. Accounting for Economic Sentiment
If Uruguayan presidents are judged by how bright they make Uruguayan citizens’ 
personal economic futures, it is logical to ask what drives these perceptions. More 
generally, we wish examine which bits of hard economic data feed the four most 
theoretically interesting variants of economic perceptions at our disposal. Here we 
must acknowledge the limitations with which we can parallel the original “Peasant 
or Bankers” analysis. Whereas Makuen, Erickson, and Stimson could show that the 
U.S. Department of Commerce’s Index of Leading Economic Indicators heavily 
influence the public’s national economic outlook. Lacking such a measure in this 
case, we restrict ourselves to testing how inflation, unemployment, and household 
incomes matter for subjective economic indicators. 
Table 4 includes the results. A key theme among the results is that inflation plays a 
central role in shaping personal economic sentiment. It drives down both personal 
prospections (column 1) and, to a lesser extent, retrospections (column 2). Puzzlingly, 
inflation does not impinge on expectations for the national economy in either the 
short (one year) or long (three years) run. These null findings hold even in a stripped 
down model that included only the lagged dependent variable and inflation on 
the right-hand side. Uruguayans, it seems, take inflation personally—it registers 
primarily in prospects of their own personal, not national, well-being. Models 5 and 
6 suggest buying conditions for household durables and automobiles/cars reflect, 
not surprisingly, household income levels and, for the former, inflation.
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Table 4 
Explaining Components of Consumer Confidence
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Personal 
Prospections
Personal 
Retrospections
Short-Run 
National 
Prospections
Long-Run 
National 
Prospections
Buying 
Conditions 
Household 
Durables
Buying  
Conditions  
Autos/Houses
Inflation
-0.35***
(0.13)
-0.20***
(0.06)
0.02
(0.13)
0.06
(0.18)
-0.39**
(0.14)
-0.29
(0.20)
Unemployment
-0.34
(0.67)
-0.15
(0.62)
-1.14
(0.82)
2.68**
(1.18)
-0.86
(0.88)
-0.03
(1.09)
Household 
Incomes (Log
10
)
t
8.37
(14.16)
17.40
(11.38)
-21.32
(19.80)
-14.83
(24.99)
56.24**
(21.34)
49.46**
(24.32)
Honeymoon
4.24***
(1.45)
-1.75
(2.71)
0.87
(1.55)
-0.41
(2.48)
-0.77
(2.79)
-2.92
(2.94)
Personal 
Prospections
t-1
0.54***
(0.08)
Personal 
Retrospections
t-1
0.42**
(0.17)
Short-Run 
National 
Prospections
t-1
0.17
(0.18)
Long-Run 
National 
Prospections
t-1
0.45*** 
(0.15)
Personal 
Prospections
t-1
Current Buying 
Conditions 
Household 
Durables
t-1
0.81***
(0.08)
Current Buying 
Conditions 
Automobile
t-1
0.80***
(0.08)
Constant
30.28
(53.05)
-19.16
(52.27)
150.41*
(77.46)
78.44**
(102.74)
-197.38**
(83.28)
-184.61**
(93.62)
Observations 54 54 54 55 54 54
R2 0.83 0.41 0.11 0.46 0.77 0.74
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Discussion: A Democracy of Piggybankers?
Our case study of Uruguay from the last half of 2007 through the last half of 2013 
began with the same question that motivated MacKuen, Erikson, and Stimson’s 
(1992, 597 and 606) study of the American public opinion more than two decades 
ago: when the public makes political judgments based on the handling of the 
economy, does it behave like a “peasant” or a “banker”? Our answer now seems 
clear, if at odds with previous research might have predicted. 
The Uruguayan public assessed the two presidents under study according to the 
stylized logic of a “piggybanker.” Namely, it evaluated them on the basis of an 
informed view of its personal economic prospects rather than its how it compares 
its present to past economic conditions or the nation’s economic prospects. 
Uruguayans judge their presidents on anticipated economic performance, given 
what forecasts they may have heard or their intuition about the logical implications 
of policies the government is currently implementing. At this point, we cannot say 
whether this information comes from the downward trickle of information about 
leading economic indicators from experts to the media, or whether Uruguayans’ 
own negative experiences with inflation make them hypersensitive to its pernicious 
effects on their own pocketbooks and savings accounts. While we have no evidence 
for the former interpretation and some evidence consistent with the latter, without 
more research we cannot say for sure which inference is most valid. 
It is also intriguing to observe inflation, and little else, driving expectations about how 
the economy will affect them as individuals (i.e. personal prospections). Moreover, 
inflation is the only objective measure of the economy that had a direct influence 
on presidential approval in the absence of subjective mediators. So far from being 
unconcerned about inflation, as Singer’s (2009) regional analysis of Latin America 
would predict, Uruguayans in this period seem to have a one-track mind when it comes 
to the political economy of presidential approval. Inflation is king, unemployment 
(and incomes) are off their radar screens. If this is correct, perhaps the dynamics are 
better identified at monthly or quarterly intervals than at annual intervals. 
Finally, and at the risk of belaboring the point, like the conclusions of any case 
study, including the one of the United States (MacKuen, Erikson and Stimson, 
1992) upon which we model our own, we cannot say how valid these conclusions is 
beyond the period under study in Uruguay, in other Latin American countries or to 
presidential democracies, or to countries with other models of democracy. Rather, 
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we hope our results give birth to new questions or, at the very least, new ways to 
address old questions about this fundamental question of political economy. 
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Appendix
Table A1 
Economic Conditions (Including Household Incomes), Elements of the Index of 
Consumer Confidence (ICC), and Presidential Approval
  (1) (2)
Approval
t−1
0.72***
(0.10)
0.66***
(0.11)
Inflation
t
-0.27**
(0.13)
-0.13
(0.19)
Unemployment
t
0.17
(1.00)
0.22
(1.04)
Household Incomes (Log
10
)
t
8.62
(16.58)
12.66
(16.33)
Honeymoon 5.78***
(1.65)
2.23
(2.38)
Personal Retrospections
t
0.34**
(0.15)
Personal Prospections
t
0.44*
(0.26)
Constant -14.89
(74.69)
-50.09
(82.10)
Observations 52 52
R2 0.89 0.89
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
